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Social institutions are considered as generally stable entities but, at the same time, prone 
to unpredictable and even dramatical changes. The paper draws some considerations on 
this issue by means of an analysis of the notions of validity and objectivity, seen in the 
light of the critical situations that institutions may face. Consider the case of an irregular 
election that leads anyhow to a result accepted by authorities and population at large. 
Such an election seems to be valid and not valid at the same time. These contrasting 
intuitions reflect the twofold nature of institutional reality: it depends on one side on 
what is accepted by those who are dealing with it, but on the other side also on what 
it is actually going on according to its rules. The article frames this problem in terms 
of response-dependence. in this respect, it follows, but also expands, hindriks (2006), 
to reach the conclusion that institutions are easily prone to fall apart. anyway, not in 
all cases this actually happens; on the contrary, institutions seem to be quite stable. 
We propose that what makes them stable, but also unpredictable, is, in a sense, a sort 
of misunderstanding among the involved agents. explaining such misunderstanding 
amounts to analyze the notion of objectivity in social reality. We argue that objectivity 
is more a requirement than a feature of institutional systems, being institutional objects 
mind and context-dependent.
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Suppose a significant number of voters is voting in the wrong way. For exam-
ple, they make marks on the ballots that compromise their secrecy. accord-
ing to the rules, their vote is null. But, in order to be considered as null by 
the institution, these votes must be recognized as null by some other “rel-
evant” people (poll watchers, judges of some court). suppose that, for some 
reason, none of them recognize the violation and suppose, on top of this, 
that none of the voters realize that her/his vote was wrongly expressed by 
the poll; what we have here is a situation in which, from a god’s eye perspec-
tive, the entire election is null, but from the perspective of the considered 
group the election is valid. Valid, exactly because it appears to be valid. 
the situation is somehow surreal, but it makes a point: institutional real-
ity is twofold, but in a very peculiar way. There is a significant difference 
between what is really going on according to the rules and what is believed 
and accepted by those who are dealing with the institution. nonetheless, 
what is believed and accepted is crucial in assessing what is really going on 
in the institution. as a further complication, we cannot avoid to use some 
strong sense of objectivity: in many situations we feel that it is important 
to know what actually happened according to the rules, as we want this to 
have an influence on our decisions. 
What we would like to claim is that in the domain of social ontology some-
how both views are not only needed but somehow inevitable to retain. if 
we lost the former, we would have to say that what is objective has no role 
in what is ontological in social reality, and then no subsequent discovery of 
error can have any role in establishing who won the elections, if we lost the 
latter we would end up saying that what is subjective is not relevant, un-
dermining the very sense of social activities, including polls. then, what is 
needed in order for such kinds of situations to be “fully” valid?
this seems to be a problem that is peculiar of the social domain, since ap-
parently it does not apply, at least not in the same way, to contexts such as 
the natural one, or, to be more precise, to the so-called mesoscopic level: if we 
wrongly believe that “the cat is on the mat”, such belief has few effects on the 
actual position of the cat. on top of this, the example above seems to clearly 
belong to a subdomain of the social, that is the institutional one. institutions, 
aPPeaRanCe CountinG as Reality? soMe ConsiDeRations  
on staBility anD unPReDiCtaBility in soCial institutions
e. BottaZZi, r. Ferrario  istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione di Trento 
141
as many have pointed out, depend, in order to exist, on rules that define some 
of their own relevant aspects; e.g., voting rules are essential for polls. 
one of the main supporters of the latter view is certainly John searle (1969, 
1995, 2010); take as an instance his famous analysis of constitutive rules, 
that has generated an important field of studies. But one of the criticisms 
that has often been moved to searle’s account is that it is too centered on 
positive situations in which agents quickly agree and are successful in their 
cooperation, but is less effective when analyzing critical cases, cases as this 
one, that may be puzzling, but also revealing. to be completely honest, such 
criticism was only supported by a minority1 of scholars and, in general, even 
if it seems obvious that we often face critical situations in our social and 
institutional activities, there is not much work carried out in analytic social 
ontology about this very fact.
taking care of this “dark side” of social ontology is crucial, also because 
rules themselves may constitute a threat to the understanding of the ontol-
ogy of the world they create. aside of their misapplication, as in our poll 
case, contradictions or faults may be part of the rules themselves and this 
makes it difficult to assess what is valid in some specific institutional do-
main. one of the desired outcomes of this analysis is to establish some pil-
lars in order to draw a link between these two dimensions (misapplication 
and faults in the rules), as these are important assets for the understand-
ing of the dynamics of institutions. our starting point will be the notion 
of acceptance-dependence as developed by Frank hindriks, and especially 
the version he proposes of the concept constitutional. this analysis, comple-
mented with our considerations about the “dark side”, will allow us to show 
some of those traits that make institutions so stable and, at the same time, 
so prone to sudden, unpredictable changes.
there are many possible ways of conceptualizing the problem of acceptance 
in social ontology. an interesting and somehow new way to give a stronger 
grasp of the issue is by re-describing it in terms of the recently and widely de-
bated notion of response dependence2. the term “response-dependent concept” 
was introduced by mark Johnston, (1989, 146, footnote 8) and, in a nutshell, is 
aimed to capture the idea that there are concepts that are intrinsically, or a-
priori, determined by our responses; they “are tailor-made for creatures like us 
1  For example (Balzer 2002) and (schmid 2009). 
2  there are many theories around on this notion, for recent reviews of the literature see (yates 
2008) and (gundersen 2010). 
aPPeaRanCe CountinG as Reality? soMe ConsiDeRations  
on staBility anD unPReDiCtaBility in soCial institutions
e. BottaZZi, r. Ferrario  istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione di Trento 
1. 
Acceptance 
Dependence 
(and its Dark 
Side)
142
who are capable, as many intelligences may not be, of certain responses: capa-
ble of finding things smooth to the touch, bland to the taste, red to the eye”3. 
the classical example are colors4; something is red if and only if, in normal 
conditions, this very something is disposed to look this way to normal subjects. 
it is important to stress that the thing has to look red to a normal subject in 
normal conditions, since the idea is to have some kind of objectivity, suppos-
ing that all these conditions can be specified in a germane manner; that is, it is 
to select the conditions in a way “to ensure that no other circumstances could 
have given the judgment formed a greater credibility”5.
Frank Hidrinks (2006) was perhaps among the first scholars who attempted 
to make a systematic link between sociality and response-dependence, 
by introducing the notion of acceptance-dependence. to this aim, he starts 
by considering Crispin Wright’s (1988, 1992) specific approach on the issue 
(called judgement-dependence), since he sees the latter as more similar to 
acceptance-dependence than any of the other available accounts. the main 
difference between the two approaches is that judgement-dependent con-
cepts depend on counterfactual responses of individuals while, in contrast, 
acceptance-dependent concepts depend on the actual responses of groups of 
people. the counterfactual idea of judgment-dependence amounts to saying 
that the judgments of standard subjects under standard conditions are des-
tined to be correct: something is red if and only if an idealized subject has 
the red-judgment in standard situations. instead, if we take a social concept, 
for instance popular, we have to consider the actual responses by groups of 
people. in order to assess if the concept of popular applies to ada, we have to 
see if ada is actually liked by a relevant number of people, rather than trying 
to find out whether an idealized subject has the popular-judgment in stan-
dard circumstances. another relevant difference is the contextual character 
of the notion of acceptance: being popular is something generally true with 
respect to some group of people, but false if referred to another. 
hindriks provides an interesting analysis of the concept constitutional, that 
we want to use as a scaffolding for the analysis of validity, as we mentioned 
in the introduction. But being valid in our sense is not necessarily being 
“legally valid in a specific legislation”; instead, we want  our analysis to be 
more general, we want it to encompass what is decided as the final outcome 
of an election, even if we would like this outcome also to be taken into ac-
3  (Pettit 1991, 587). 
4  even if it has been argued that colors may be not response dependent, e.g. in (Johnston 
1989), we will use them here just as illustration of the notion.  
5   (Wright 1992, 109). 
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count in the analysis. the analysis of constitutional is therefore useful but, 
at the same time, it can not be sufficient to characterize our notion, since, 
at least as it is presented in hindriks’ account, it seems to mean something 
very similar to “legally valid in a specific legislation”:
hindriks’ account moves from a criticism of Johnston’s:
Johnston claims that constitutional is judgment-dependent and offers the 
following analysis: 
“Thus the concept of a uS state or federal law’s being constitutional is... the 
concept of the Supreme Court’s not being disposed to ultimately regard it as 
unconstitutional. (Being constitutional is the default condition)” (1993, p. 
104; emphasis in original). [...] Johnston’s analysis is problematic because it is 
compatibility – or rather, incompatibility – with the constitution that matters, 
instead of what the Supreme Court is disposed to do. (hindriks 2006, 486)
As Hindriks remarks later, “constitutionality is fixed independently of what 
the supreme court is disposed to do” (hindriks 2006, 487), it is what is writ-
ten in the constitution that marks the difference between what is and what 
is not constitutional. in this case, what makes something constitutional 
is anyway non-counterfactual, being constitutional something related to 
the citizens contextual and actual acceptance of the constitution. actu-
ally accepting the constitution is, indirectly, provinding actual criteria of 
constitutionality. said that, he highlights another important point. there 
are problematic cases, where it is difficult to asses whether something is 
constitutional or not. in these cases the authority of the supreme court is 
what determines whether or not a law is constitutional. in these latter cases, 
anyway, actual rather than counterfactual responses are crucial for the ap-
plication of the concept constitutional. 
Now we move to consider Hindriks’ definition of acceptance-dependence. In 
his paper he provides slightly different definitions of it, but the definition we 
are interested in is the one that is best suited for the concept constitutional: 
[ad*] x is f in context C in context C group g accepts a rule r or 
authority T has declared that a rule r is in force and according to this 
rule x is f. (hindriks 2006, 492).
For hindriks the formulation above “explicates the relation between rules, 
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our actual responses, and concepts that depend on them in an indirect man-
ner” (hindriks 2006, 492), that is to say that it can be applied to the concept 
of constitutional, because it covers both the unproblematic cases with sets 
of accepted rules, when it is sufficient to refer to the Constitution (expressed 
in the first disjunct of the right part of the bi-conditional), and the problem-
atic ones, when we have to recur to the authority of the supreme court (the 
second disjunct of the right part of the bi-conditional).
We believe that even if this analysis has its own merits of clarity and it is 
quite intuitive, it is not applicable to our case, namely to define the concept 
valid6 that we would like to use in our analysis. the reason for such inap-
plicability is in the “or” in the right part of the bi-conditional. let’s consider 
the poll example provided at the beginning of the paper. If Hindriks’ defini-
tion is correct, then we would not feel any problem in accepting the validity 
of the electoral outcome. the outcome is perhaps constitutional, but it is not 
“fully” valid, since what actually happened is against what has been fixed in 
the rules. In our intuition, in order to have “full” validity, what is fixed in 
the agreed rule and what comes as the final decision of the authority have to 
be in accordance, something like: x is valid in context C in context C group g 
accepts a rule r and authority T has declared that a rule r is in force and ac-
cording to this rule x is valid. 
this is to say that valid is a response-dependent concept with a “stricter” 
definition than the one of constitutional, since the disjunctive formulation 
implies the conjunctive: it holds, in principle, in less cases. What are the 
consequences of this line of reasoning? Validity for an institution is the very 
heart of the institution itself. an institution that is perceived as not valid is 
bound to failure, since the mismatch between what the rule, if significant, 
says and how it is applied, makes the whole system unable to coordinate 
people’s action and then no more acceptable for them. if, in the example 
above, everyone involved in the poll woke up and realized that the outcome 
of the election, established by authority, did not reflect what actually hap-
pened, then there are good chances that the whole system would fall apart. 
this is, we believe, something inherent to every institutional system and 
also, so to speak, one of its most problematic “dark sides”7.  
6  some of the criticisms that we will provide for valid hold also for constitutional, but we will 
not concentrate on them in this work, due to space limitations, but also because consitutional is 
not the focus of the paper, for reasons expressed earlier in this section.
7  there are other elements in this dark side; for example rules can be contradictory, as in the 
case of the discursive dilemma (list and Pettit 2004), but we will not deal with such elements in 
this paper. 
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this dichotomy between rule and authority manifests itself very often in the 
life of an institutional system, but anyway not in all cases everything falls 
apart. on the contrary, institutions seem to be quite stable8. We believe that 
what makes them stable, to put it in a provocative way, is misunderstanding.
What we have established so far is that there is a certain requirement 
of objectivity of rules and their application. this is to say that, for some 
institutional entity to be considered as valid in the full sense, rules have to 
be correctly applied in accordance with what they say. then, we suggested 
that breaking this link between rules and application is potentially harmful 
for the institutional system as a whole: if members of the community 
perceive that the system is not valid anymore, they cease to accept it and 
this will very likely make it fall apart, or will force a substantial change. let 
us elaborate a bit on this to conclude, from the following considerations, 
that it is exactly because agents involved do not have a clear idea of what is 
going on in their institutions that institutions are generally stable and, at 
the same time, prone to unpredictably end up in critical situations. 
objectivity in our view is more a requirement than something that is effectively 
and always present in our institutional world. But before going into that, we 
have to illustrate why objectivity is important. the main reason is that what 
is believed can have a crucial effect on what is accepted. acceptance and belief 
are often considered, by philosophers, as distinct9. normally, you can cheat in 
a game only if i don’t know that you are cheating. this is not entirely correct, 
since i can go on playing even if i believe that you are cheating. among the 
various points made to support the distinction between belief and acceptance, 
(cohen 1992) says something interesting: belief and acceptance differ in that 
acceptance arises from adopting a policy to achieve a particular goal. i accept 
that p if i have the policy of postulating that p. in our game, i can accept your 
cheating because i will gain some advantage by doing it, for example, i simply 
can be happy to let you win. if i accept your cheating, it means that what we 
both accept is the fact that we are playing regularly, but each one of us believe 
that the game is not valid, or, better, that it is not fully valid, since the cheating 
has not been declared10 and accepted yet. But if i discover the cheat i can halt the 
game, in the sense that i have good arguments to make you accept, for example, 
that the game is null or that you ought to be sanctioned.  
8  This point is quite accepted in literature, from the first studies in sociology (Weber 1968) to 
the latest in philosophy of sociality (searle 2010).
9  For example (cohen 1992), (Bratman 1999) and (tuomela 2000).  
10  the underlying idea is that collective acceptance is carried out by means of declaratives. 
For some recent work on declaratives see (searle 2010) and (tuomela 2011). 
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there are other motivations that can force agents to declare the 
misapplication and try to convince the others to accept it and, then, to act 
accordingly. aside malicious interests, one of the main motivations is the 
understanding of the fact that, in some cases, the misapplication could be 
harmful for coordination. For example, i can realize that my opponent is 
misapplying the rules in such a way that i do not know how to reply with 
another move. if i feel that i am in a deadlock and i cannot go on playing, we 
can say that i feel forced to declare the misapplication. 
this is enough for arguing that objectivity, as we intended it here, plays 
a crucial role in institutional systems as a requirement. But this does not 
mean that this is also a necessary condition for an institutional system 
to be an institutional system, this just tells us that agents can use this 
requirement in order to make other agents accept that some misapplication 
has taken place and change their behavior accordingly. 
For some theorists we have a sort of objectivity in our knowledge of social 
reality. the debate is very complex 11, and we will suggest just two quick 
lines of attack to this position.  The first line deals with the relationship be-
tween the ontological and the epistemological dimension. 
according to searle, the institutional reality is ontologically subjective, i.e. 
it depends, for its existence, on agents’ mind. on a par with this thesis, we 
have the other one, namely that the institutional reality is also epistemically 
objective. this means that “it is, for example, an epistemically objective fea-
ture of this thing that it is a screwdriver; but that feature exists only rela-
tive to observers and users, and so the feature is ontologically subjective.” 
(searle 1995, 10). 
 We believe that this objectivity is not as firm as Searle would want it to 
be. the dependence of social entities on agents’ minds, rules and their ap-
plication makes things less objective than one could think and leaves room 
for misunderstandings or lack of proper knowledge of what is going on in 
the institutional system. to see it, let’s go back to the comparison searle 
makes with artifacts on one side, like screwdrivers, and social entities on 
11  see (searle 1995, 2010), but (thomasson 2003) has even a more extreme position on that. 
(guala 2010) labels this position as infallibilism, meaning that, being social kinds a product of 
stipulation, then at least some (relevant) members of the community that makes such stipulation 
cannot be wrong about them: “we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own 
institutional [...] kinds, protecting us from certain possibilities of ignorance and error (thomasson 
2003, 580).”
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the other. suppose we accept that there is something like “an objective 
feature” that allows us to classify this thing as a screwdriver. nonethe-
less, screwdrivers can be used in different manners, not even imagined by 
the users and the creators of the screwdriver. this could happen in such a 
way as to make it difficult to recognize this thing as a screwdriver: it is so 
out of context that we cannot understand anymore what it is. this holds, 
in principle, for all the things we were willing to classify as screwdrivers, 
but, actually, these different uses pose a threat neither to the new nor to 
the old context. there is just a new concept for classifying things with the 
same old shape. this  boils down to say that i can use the very same thing 
as a screwdriver and as a nail. But to deal with the institutional world is 
a different matter. Institutional entities have rules that concur to define 
them, we can say that the former have a content that establishes their use, 
since they are themselves made up of rules, not out of physical matter as 
screwdrivers. on top of this, they are related to a context of other rules 
and such context is much stricter. if we go out of the original context, 
there is always the possibility that we cannot understand what is the new 
application anymore, as we also suggested when talking about objectivity 
as a requirement and its role in coordination. 
the second line of attack is that acceptance and belief have to be considered 
as spreading all over an institution, especially through the agents involved, 
who are, in the end, those that put social reality into existence. as we said 
for the chess example, each “move” of each agent involved in the institution 
has to be accepted by the other agents. But this means that in order to asses 
what is valid in the full sense and what is not, we should check every agent’s 
action, epistemic attitude and act of acceptance. moreover, institutions as 
states have a huge amount of rules and dispositions and they perform, via 
they relevant members, a vast amount of institutional actions. it is then 
very likely to imagine that each agent has a limited amount of knowledge on 
what is going on in the institution.
how do members of an institution cope with this state of ignorance or mis-
understanding? there are many possibilities that need to be explored, a 
tentative solution could be that they rely on trust. they somehow trust each 
other and the authority for the application and control of the application of 
the rules and for resolving difficult matters. But also authorities (as relevant 
members) have a limited, even if, maybe, greater, amount of knowledge of 
what is going on in the system, and they are also forced to trust the system. 
the fact that we trust that, at the end of the day, rules are more or less ap-
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plied in the correct way, exactly because we don’t have a precise way to 
establish it, is what makes institutions stable. But this can enhance the pos-
sibility, for some of the perviously mentioned reasons, of a serious divorce 
between rules and their application. normally, this divorce has no dramatic 
effects on the institutional reality, as it is not even recognized by its mem-
bers and agents tend to rely more on the application than on the rules them-
selves. We said also that the system is unpredictable for the same reasons. 
this is to remark how unlikely it is that the agents realize the effective sta-
tus of the system, in this case that there is a problem in the rule-application 
axis. and also when they realize it, it could be that they have no interest in 
making this explicit or accepted. even when explicitly accepted, they can be 
happy with it, meaning that it can have no interference with their policy.  it 
is only when there is a convergence of this very complex chain of beliefs and 
acceptances with some specific crucial interests, like the need for coordina-
tion, that the system falls apart. 
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